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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
MILLER PONTIAC, INC., 
a Utah corporation, d/b/a 
LAURY MILLER PONTIAC, 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. 
JANET S. OSBORNE, 
) 
, ) Case No. 16847 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
* * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action regarding a breach of contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After the trial court overruled the motion of counsel 
for appellant for a continuance based upon the appellant's ab-
sence and lack of knowledge of the trial, h~ heard the case and 
' determined that the appellant breached her contract with the 
respondent. The trial court then refused to modify the judgment 
or award a new trial when advised of both his erroneous rulings 
and the failure of respondent to comply with the law regarding 
resale after repossession. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks in the alternative either judgment in 
her favor that respondent breached the contract with appellant or 
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breached its statutory duties to appellant and is thus not en-
titled to relief from appellant or reversal of the judgment of 
the trial court and remand of the case for a fair re-trial. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The parties entered into a contract whereby the plain-
tiff sold the defendant an automobile. A contract was signed on 
March 20, 1978 and a second on or about April 10, 1978. (R. 2, 
105-106, 126, 129-130) Shortly after the signing of the second 
contract, the car ceased operating and was returned by the 
appellant to the respondent. (Ro 133, 214-215) Thereafter, the 
appellant refused to pay for the car so respondent repaired it, 
resold it (without notice to the appellant) and instituted the 
instant action against appellant for damages in the amount of 
$14,287.04 plus interest and attorneys fees. {R. 2-4). 
The appellant purchased the automobile for her son, 
Don. He drove it for three weeks and it ceased to operate (R. 
217). Don testified that sometimes, because of the power of the 
car and injuries he had suffered, the car would "patch out", that 
is the clutch would pop out so fast that the rear wheels would 
spin before the car could go into an even starting motion (R. 
207, 217) but both he and two of his friends, who frequently 
drove with him during the three weeks that he had the automobile 
in his possession testified that he drove it carefully and con-
siderately. (R. 197-198, 200-201, 204, 207, 208, 209) Despite 
this caution and care, the car ceased to operate three weeks 
after its purchase. (R. 217) 
-2-
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Don Osborne testified that a few days before the car 
ceased to function, he heard unusual noises and took the car in 
for servicing. Although he left it all day at Laury Miller's, 
the service department did nothing with the car. (R. 207, 211-
212) Since he intended to take the car on a trip to Bear Lake 
and was worried about the noises, he asked if it would be all 
right to do so without their having performed service upon it and 
was informed that this could be done. (R. 207, 209, 210, 211-
212) . 
After receiving this reassurance, Mr. Osborne took the 
car on the trip. When the noise became worse, he pulled into a 
gas station at Park City, Utah for service. The car was low on 
oil and four quarts were added. (R. 213) When he returned to 
Salt Lake City, the car simply stopped running and smoke began 
pouring from it. (R. 214). Thereafter, Mr. Osborne called Laury 
Miller and told them to take the car back. (R. 214). Mr. Osborne 
informed respondent to keep the car if they would not put a new 
engine in it; respondent informed him that he should pay for 
repairs and keep the car. (R. 218-129). 
The mechanic who repaired the car for respondent 
testified that he felt that the car had been run at excessive 
RPM, had suffered excessive clutch and rear tire wear, found the 
car to be full of oil and did not find damage consistent with the 
testimony of Mr. Osborne that he had to add the four quarts of 
oil. (R. 270-175). 
-3-
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The automobile, after repair, was resold at a profit by 
respondent to another purchaser without notice to appellant. (R. 
68-69, 162) 
Trial of this case was repeatedly reset by the court 
before it ultimately came to trial. The clerk of Salt Lake 
County originally set this matter for trial on March 28, 1979, by 
a notice mailed July 26, 1978. (R. 12) A pre-trial settlement 
conference was thereafter held on March 8, 1979, (R. 20) and the 
trial date of March 28, 1979, was confirmed. (R. 21) On March 
23, 1979, the clerk's office, based on the fact that no judge 
would be available to hear the case, continued the trial to May 
24, 1979. (R. 22) Thereafter, on May 24, 1979, for the conveni-
ence of the court, the trial was continued until June 13, 1979, 
(R. 48) On May 25, 1979, the trial was reset for June 11, 1979, 
(R. 49) and upon agreement of counsel for the respective parties 
on May 30, 1979, an amended notice of continuance was sent out 
confirming the trial date of June 11, 1979. (R. 50) 
On June 11, 1979, counsel for the appellant appeared 
before the court and requested a continuance based on the fact 
that his client was not present and since he had not been able to 
confirm with his client that the trial would be on June 11, 1979, 
stated he did not know if she knew it would be held. He stated 
he felt that her case was prejudiced by going to trial without 
her. (R. 52, 92) This motion was denied by the trial court who 
compelled counsel for the appellant to go forward in her absence. 
(R. 52-53, 92-93) 
-4-
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After trial, counsel for appellant discussed the trial 
with appellant and learned that no notice of the resale or intent 
to resell the automobile was ever sent by respondent to appellant. 
After judgment was entered against appellant, the trial court was 
informed of this (R. 68-69). In oral argument of the motion for 
new trial or to amend judgment, counsel for the respondent ad-
mitted no evidence of compliance with Section 70A-9-504 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, could be found but asserted that this was not 
timely raised. The trial court overruled the appellant's motions 
(R. 77, 78) and this appeal was taken (R. 80). 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
A CONTINUANCE TO APPELLANT AND REQUIRING APPELLANT'S 
COUNSEL TO GO TO TRIAL WHEN APPELLANT WAS NOT AVAILABLE 
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDINGS, DID NOT HAVE NOTICE 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND THERE WAS NO PREJUDICE TO RESPON-
DENT WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED FROM A CONTINUANCE. 
This court has declared that: 
" • it is in accord with the most fundamental 
traditions of our legal system that a party should 
be afforded every reasonable opportunity to be in 
attendance at his trial. Jaffe v. Lilienthal, 101 
Cal. 175, 35 P. 636; cf. Westfall v. Motors Ins. 
Corp., 36 Mont. 449, 348 P.2d 784 (1960) ." 
Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 273, 373 P.2d 375 (1972). This 
rule was rejected by the trial court in the instant matter when 
-5-
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appellant's counsel was forced to go to trial in her absence. 
This abuse is pronounced in this case as the matter was repeatedly 
reset for trial by the court, not either of the parties. When the 
trial date was finally set and held, counsel was unable to confirm 
the reset trial date with his client between May 30, 1979 and 
June 11, 1979. As a result, despite intense efforts both by her 
son and her attorney to reach her she was not available for trial.* 
The respondent was ready for trial on June 11, 1979 but 
asserted no prejudice to the court if the trial were continued. 
Respondent's counsel simply asserted that he was present with his 
witnesses and desired to proceed. Despite all these factors the 
trial court required counsel for appellant to proceed in her 
absence. 
In Bairas v. Johnson, supra, as in the instant matter, 
a motion for continuance was overruled by the trial court and a 
party was required to go to trial because the deposition of that 
party was available for use by the court. This Court noted 
regarding such a procedure that: 
" ... the superiority of oral testimony to that 
taken by deposition is apparent, and resort to 
deposition to introduce a party's testimony of 
trial should be done only when the circumstances 
will not reasonably allow a desirous party to 
appear in his own behalf." 13 Utah 2d at 273; 
373 P.2d at 
*Appellant was in Texas and all efforts to inform her of 
the trial before it started failed. 
-6-
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The appellant's testimony was vital to her case. Counsel for the 
appellant did not learn that two contracts between the parties had 
been signed as far apart ·as March 20th and April 10th until the 
course of the trial. (R. 181) Nor did counsel for appellant 
learn that there had been no notice of the resale of the auto-
mobile by respondent until after the trial had been completed. 
(R. 68-69) This was in part a result of settlement negotiations 
between the parties which were initiated immediately after the 
depositions of the parties and te:pninated slightly before the 
trial but it was also a result of an inability of counsel for 
appellant to work with her over the discovered documents before 
trial. In addition, testimony regarding face-to-face negotiations 
between appellant and Jim Hayes, Ken Christofferson and Jeff Tebbs 
could not be presented. Finally, a defense which could well be 
decisive in this matter was not discovered until after trial. 
Thus, as noted by this Court in Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d at 
273, the impact on appellant's position of her non-attendance was 
crucial. 
This is underlined by the fact that the continuance was 
requested not because appellant had determined not to come to 
court or had taken evasive or diliatory action or ignored the 
matter but simply did not know that the case had been set for 
trial. The repeated continuances in this case had resulted from 
the action of the court, not from either party and appellant could 
-7-
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not be reached by her counsel after the May 30th confirmation of 
the trial setting by counsel and the court. 
This was not discovered until a few days before trial 
and once counsel for appellant learned of the problem he informed 
counsel for respondent that he was having trouble locating his 
client and might have to make a continuance request if he could 
not reach her. This was confirmed immediately before going to 
trial when counsel for appellant had definitely determined neither 
he nor the appellant's son had been able to reach the appellant to 
inform her that the trial was going to occur. 
As much notice as could reasonably be prepared and 
transmitted was effected. Under such circumstances this court has 
held that: 
11 Whatever the rule might be when counsel have 
ample time within which to make a motion for 
continuance, when counsel are taken by surprise, 
as in this case, so that they do not have five 
days in which to serve the motion, they are not 
precluded from making the motion." 13 Utah 2d at 
274. 
In this case, counsel for the appellant learned only a few days 
before the trial that appellant might not know about the trial. 
He notified counsel for respondent of the problem and tried both 
personally and through appellant's son, Don Osborne, to inform her 
of the trial but was unable to do so. Consequently, the notice 
contemplated under Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
could not be provided. However, under that rule as construed by 
-8-
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the Utah Supreme Court in Bairas v. Johnson, supra, proper and 
adequate notice for the motion for continuance was presented. 
Finally, it should be noted that no showing of any 
unfairness or damage to respondent was asserted when counsel for 
appellant made this request for continuance. The appellant was 
not offered the option of paying costs to have the matter con-
tinued, Youngren v. John W. Lloyd Construction Co., 22 Utah 2d 
207, 450 P.2d 985 (1969), her motion was simply overruled and she,. 
to her obvious detriment, (through her counsel) was forced to go 
into a trial. This abuse of discretion requires this court to 
reverse the judgment entered against the appellant and remand the 
matter for a new trial. Bairas v. Johnson, supra. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS 
OF SECTION 70A-9-501 AND 504, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1953) PRECLUDES THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AGAINST APPELLANT. 
'This Court has ruled: 
"In an action for a deficiency judgment such 
as this the secured party has the burden of 
establishing that the disposition of the 
property was done in a commercially reasonable 
manner, and that reasonable notice to the 
debtor(s) was given." (Emphasis added) 
FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 
at 806-07 (Utah 1979). 
In this case after appellant returned the car to 
respondent, it was resold at a profit (R. 162) but no notice 
of the intent to sell or of the sale was ever given to the 
-9-
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appellant. Accordingly, respondent has not met its burden and 
was not entitled to the deficiency judgment which is in reality 
the judgment entered by the trial court against appellant. In 
this case as in FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 
at 807-08, no notice was given of the resale and no deficiency 
judgment should have been granted to respondent. 
After the trial, when appellant discussed the matter 
with her counsel, she advised her counsel for the first time 
that she had never received notice of this resale or even 
notice that respondent intended to resell the car. Counsel for 
appellant raised this with the trial court as a part of appel-
lant's motion pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (R. 68-69) • Even though counsel for respondent 
admitted in oral argument on these motions that no such notice 
was transmitted to appellant, the trial court overruled appel-
lant's motions (Ro 77, 78). In making this ruling the trial 
court erred as respondent's invocation of Section 70-A-9-501 
and 504 Utah Code Annotated 1953 required the trial court to 
deny the respondent any recovery on its complaint once it was 
established that appellant had ,no notice of the sale. 
Counsel for respondent asserted that the appellant's 
failure to raise this defense before trial precluded court 
consideration of this defense. Counsel for appellant responded 
that it had been raised in a timely fashion due to the fact 
-10-
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that the trial court had overruled a motion for continuance and 
compelled counsel for the appellant to go to trial when she was 
not present and that the matter was now being raised before the 
judgment had become final and appealable. Nonetheless, the 
trial court overruled these objections (R. 77-78) and this 
appeal followed. 
Utah law is very clear that where the're is a failure 
to comply with the provisions of Section 70A-9-504(3) Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, through a failure to provide notice of the 
proposed sale it precludes a deficiency judgment against the 
debtor. FMA Financial Corporation v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 
803 (Utah 1979); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Burns, 562 P.2d 233 
(Utah 1977). In the instant action, there is no question that 
the car over which this action has been maintained was resold 
by respondent after repossession and that the resale produced a 
profit to respondent. (R. 157, 158-159, 162, 166). Thus the 
trial court erred in overruling the appellant's motions and 
should either have modified the judgment or set it aside and 
directed a re-trial of this matter. 
While respondent asserts that the failure of appellant 
to properly raise this in the pleadings prevents consideration 
of the issue, appellant asserts that she did raise it in as 
timely a fashion as she could in the face of the actions of 
the trial court. This is not a situation like that considered 
-11-
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by this court in Zions First National Bank v. Hurst, 570 P.2d 
1031 (Utah 1977}, where the obligation so far exceeded the debt 
that notice of the sale would have been of no effect nor pro-
duced any injustice. Nor is it like the case of American State 
Insurance Company v. Miller, Adams and Crawford, 557 P.2d 756 
(Utah 1976} where the issue of the failure to comply with 
Section 70A-9-504 Utah Code Annotated 1953 was raised for the 
first time on appeal. The defense in the instant action was 
raised to the trial court, admitted by the respondent and 
improperly rejected by the trial court before the judgment 
became final. This rejection of clear legal principle by the 
trial court requires this court to reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and either enter judgment in favor of appellant or 
remand for trial on the question of compliance with the provi-
sions of Section 70A-9-501 and 504, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT WAS AWARDED EXCESSIVE DAMAGES TO WHICH 
IT WAS NOT ENTITLED. 
It is Horbook Blackletter Law that: 
"To recover substantial damages for a given 
claim of loss or damage, the plaintiff has 
the burden of proving such loss or damage 
did in fact result, and that it was caused 
by defendant's wrongdoing". Handbook on 
the Law of Damages, Charles T. McCormick, 
West Pub. Co. 1935, P. 53, 
or as the rule was stated by this court: 
-12-
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"One is liable only for the actual damage his 
acts provoke." Thompson v. Jacobson, 23 Utah 
2d 359, 360, 463 P.2d 801 (1970). 
This principle was rejected by the trial court in the judgment 
entered against appellant and this court must correct that error. 
The trial court itemized the damages awarded by minute 
entry on August_6, 1979 (R. 57) and they were incorporated in the 
final judgment of the court. (R. 145-148) The objections of the 
appellant to these awards were overruled. ·(R. 77-78) In these 
rulings, the court made several obvious errors that are incon-
sistent with the evidence presented by respondent. 
The first and foremost error is that when the car was 
resold at a prof it, it was clear respondent suffered no damage 
and the complaint should have been dismissed. The court's action 
allowed Laury Miller to recover everything to whi~h it might have 
been entitled by the resale and yet awarded a double recovery by 
entering a judgment for unsustained damages as the prof it earned 
on the resale exceeded the cost of the car and repairs and all 
other elements of claimed damages. (R. 26, 157-159, 162, 166) 
In addition, damages for specific items which the 
record demonstrated were not suffered. 
The trial court awarded to the plaintiff lost profit in 
the sum of $829.00. (R. 57, 148-149) However, the record 
clearly revealed that the automobile was resold at a profit. (R. 
257, 158-159, 162, 166) In awarding the respondent lost profits 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
when they had not been lost, the trial court erred. 
The court awarded damges entitled "expense of pro-
cessing" in the sum of $100. 00. (R. 57, 67) In doing so, the 
court erred as the testimony clearly related that this $100.00 
was recovered when the automobile was resold after repair. (R. 
167) 
The trial court awarded conunissions in the sum of 
$392.01. {R. 57, 67) This was in error. $88.00 of the $392.01 
was never paid by respondent and that sum, having been recovered 
on resale, was never lost. (R. 167) 
Profit from the service contract in the sum of $260.00 
was also awarded by the trial court. (R. 57, 67) The testimony 
was that only 35% of this would have been lost had the second 
purchaser not taken a service contract. (R. 146-147) 
Finally, the court awarded $1,018.56 for the repairs 
respondent made to the automobile (R. 57, 67) despite the fact 
that the testimony revealed that the cost of those repairs to 
Laury Miller was only $778.91. {R. 145) 
In sum, the trial court awarded, assuming that the 
respondent was entitled to damages, $239.65 for the cost of 
repairs, $169.00 for profit from the service contract, $88.01 as 
lost conunissions, $829.00 as lost profit and $100.00 for the 
expense of processing, or $1,425.66 for damages not suffered by 
respondent. In addition, the court awarded $1,512.55 in damages 
not suffered as the car was resold at a profit thus recouping 
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these costs for respondent. (R. 26, 157-59, 162, 166). This 
error must be corrected by this court. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT PROPERLY REVOKED HER ACCEPTANCE UNDER 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 70A-2-608 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, OR RESCINDED THE CONTRACT. 
Utah law clearly allows a purchaser such as appellant, 
of goods which have a defect which is not discovered at the 
time of sale to either revoke her acceptance or rescind the 
contract. The Legislature has enacted a provision governing 
the revocation of acceptance: 
Section 70A-2-608 Utah Code Annotated states: 
Revocation of acceptance in whole or in part. 
--(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of 
a lot or commercial unit whose nonconformity 
substantially impairs its value to him if he 
has accepted it 
(a) on the reasonable assumption that 
its nonconformity would be cured and it has 
not been seasonably cured; or 
(b) without discovery of such noncon-
formity if his acceptance was reasonably 
induced either by the difficulty or discovery 
before acceptance or by the seller's assur-
ances. 
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur 
within a reasonable time after the buyer 
discovers or should have discovered the 
ground for it and before any substantial 
change in condition of the goods which is not 
caused by their own defects. It is not 
effective until the buyer notified the 
seller of it. 
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(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same 
rights and duties with regard to the goods 
involved as if he had rejected them. 
This court enunciated the applicable standards for 
rescission: 
11 Traditionally, a person who has been fraud-
ulently induced to enter into a contract has 
either of two remedies; he could rescind the 
transaction--tendering back what he has 
received and suing for what he has parted 
with; or, he may affirm the transaction and 
maintain an action in deceit. The Uniform 
Commercial Code makes damages available in an 
action for rescission, but it does not 
otherwise change the traditional theory of 
election of remedies. 
In this case, Buyers' conduct is not consis-
tent with affirmation of the transaction. 
They stopped making payments under the 
Agreement, and they permitted the home to be 
repossessed and sold without objection. 
Their conduct is only consistent with res-
cission. Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304 
(1979). 
Approximately three weeks after purchasing the auto-
mobile for which this action is maintained, it ceased to operate. 
Don Osborne, the person who primarily drove the automobile and 
two witnesses who had driven with him repeatedly throughout the 
three weeks that he had possessed the car, stated that he drove 
it carefully, considerately, did not abuse it and paid careful 
attention to its maintenance. (R. 197-198, 200-201, 204, 208) 
While there was no question that the car.suffered extensive 
damages and required extensive repair, (R. 170-172) the mechanic 
who repaired the automobile, Mr. Glen Olsen, testified the damage 
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~as·inconsistent with the problem that Mr. Osborne described. 
Mr. Osborne stated that the car made unusual sounds (R. 209) but 
agents of respondent said there was no problem and it was all 
right to take the car to Evanston (R 207, 210, 211-12). On the 
trip the car used a large quantity of oil (R. 171-174, 213). 
Since the damages suffered by the car were not caused 
by Mr. Osborne, there was apparently some other defect in the car 
which caused its demise so soon after being purchased. Under 
these circumstances, that defect justified the action of the 
appellant in informing the respondent that either the engine 
would have to be replaced or they must take the automobile back, 
(R. 218-219), that is, that she was withdrawing her acceptance of 
the defective merchandise under Section 70A-2-608 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, or rescinding the transaction. 
The position and action of the appellant is entirely 
consistent with the decision of this court in Mecham v. Benson, 
590 P.2d 304 (1979). As in that case, the buyer's conduct was 
consistent with rescission. When a major defect in the auto-
mobile was discovered shortly after purchase (three weeks), 
appellant returned it to the seller and allowed seller to do as 
they wished with the car. Seller took possession and resold the 
car without providing notice of the sale to appellant. This 
action was in fact an acceptance of a rescision by the respondent. 
Under these facts, that is, a major mechanical failure occurring 
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within three weeks of purchase justify fully the revocation of 
acceptance which occurred immediately upon discovering a defect 
which "substantially impaired" the value of the car to the 
appellant, Section 70A-2-608 Utah Code Annotated 1953, or res-
cission of the contract by the appellant. The trial court erred 
in failing to rule accordingly. 
This is particularly true where within three weeks of 
purchase, the automobile suffers such extensive damage despite 
the careful care given it by its driver. Such an automobile 
cannot possibly have been either merchantable or fit for the 
purpose for which it was intended and therefore the sale of such 
merchandise combined with the refusal of respondent to remedy the 
defects reveals a clear violation of the provisions of Section 
70A-2-314, Utah Code Annotated 1953. When respondents refused to 
repair said automobile, they violated their warranty duties under 
this statute and if, as they have asserted, they modified in the 
purchase contract, the warranties required of them by Section 
70A-2-314, Utah Code Annotated 1953, their position cannot be 
upheld. 
Under the provisions of Section 70A-3-316 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 and the provisions of the Magnuson-Moss warranty 
Act, codified as 15 United States Code, Sections 2301, et seq., 
the respondent is prohibited from revoking or disclaiming this 
warranty. Section 2304(a) of Title 15 United States Code pro-
vides that: 
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"In order for a warrantor warranteeing a con-
sumer product by means of a written warranty to 
meet the federal minimum standards for warranty--
(!) such warrantor has a minimum remedy such 
consumer product within a rea'sonable time and 
without charge, in the case of a defect, mal-
function, or failure to conform with such writ-
ten warranty;" 
the statute goes on to provide in Sub-section (d): 
"for purposes of this section and of Section 
2302(c) of this title, the term "without charge" 
means that the warrantor may not assess the 
consumer for any costs the warrantor or his 
representatives incur in connection with the 
required remedy of a warranteed consumer product". 
Section 2308(a) of Title 15 declares: 
"No supplier may disclaim or modify (except as 
provided in sub-section (b) of this section) any 
implied warranty to a consumer with respect to 
such consumer product if (1) such supplier makes 
any written warranty to the consumer with respect 
to such consumer product, or (2) at the time of 
sale, or within 90 days thereafter, such supplier 
enters into a service contract with the consumer 
which applies to such consumer product." 
The exception clause (b) provides: 
"For purposes of this chapter (other than Section 
2304(a) (2) of this title), implied warranties may 
be limited in duration to the duration of a written 
warranty of reasonable duration, if such limitation 
is conscienable and is set forth in clear unmis-
takable language and prominently displayed on the 
face of the warranty." 
Sub-section (c) of Section 2308 of Title 15 United States Code 
then declares: "A disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in 
violation of this Section shall be ineffective for purposes of 
this Chapter and State law." Under these provisions, it is clear 
that if the respondent makes any claim that there was no implied 
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warranty of fitness and merchantability as required by Section 
70A-2-314 Utah Code Annotated 1953, the Magnuson-Moss Act pro-
visions render that disclaimer invalid. 
In the instant matter the car suffered totally disabling 
damage within three weeks of purchase. Prior to suffering that 
damage, the driver of the automobile, Don Osborne, brought it in 
to the service department of the defendant, stated it was making 
unusual noises· which should be checked, (R. 155) left it with 
respondent's service department all day and was informed (after 
learning no service had been performed) that in the opinion of the 
service people who had listened for the noise, it would be safe to 
take the car on a trip to Bear Lake. (R. 207-212) While the car 
drove with no problems to Evanston, Wyoming, on the way back the 
noises began picking up and when Mr. Osborne had it checked in 
Park City, the engine required four quarts of oil. (R. 213) When 
it arrived in Bountiful, it ceased operating altogether. (R. 214) 
Since the testimony of. the mechanic who repaired the car 
for respondent established that the damages were inconsistent with 
the description given by Mr. Osborne, there was some type of 
defect in the car which by law were included within the warranties 
established by law and which could not be waived. Since the 
respondent has refused to honor the warranties imposed upon it by 
law and insisted that the appellant pay for any repairs done, (R. 
218-219) the warranties have been disclaimed and the action of the 
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appellant in revoking her acceptance of defective goods, Section 
70A-2-608 Utah Code Annotated 1953, or rescinding the contract, 
Mecham v. Benson, supra, is appropriate. The trial court erred in 
not permitting appellant to invoke either of these doctrines and 
voiding the contract between the parties. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
TO THE RESPONDENT. 
Appellant believed that the respondent had breached its 
contract by refusing to honor its warranty and by insisting that 
appellant pay for repairs that were properly the responsibility 
of the respondent. In addition, respondent did not comply with 
the provisions of Section 70A-9-504 Utah Code Annotated in dis-
posing of the automobile which was the subject of the contract 
between the parties. Under the decisions of this Court in 
Fulmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976); Fireman's Insurance v. 
Brown, 529 P.2d 419 (Utah 1974) and Amos v. Bennion, 18 Utah 2d 
251, 420 P.2d 47 (1966) the trial court erred in awarding respon-
dent attorney's fees. 
There is no question that the contract between the 
parties provided for an award of attorney's fees if there was a 
breach of the contract. However, as this court ruled in Fulmer v. 
Blood, supra, where the appellant had justification for making 
her claims and taking the action that she took, the trial court 
appropriately could refuse to award attorney's fees. 546 P.2d 
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610. Acord Fireman's Insurance v. Brown, supra, Amos v. Bennion. 
In the instant case, the trial court abused its discretion when 
it awarded attorney's fees in light of the fact that it had 
forced counsel for the appellant to go into trial without appel-
lant, had awarded damages to the respondent to which it was not 
entitled and refused to allow revocation of acceptance or res-
cission of the contract when that action was appropriate. 
Accordingly, this error should be reversed by this court. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The trial court erred in requiring counsel for the 
appellant to go to trial in her absence. This error was com-
pounded when the court thereafter rendered judgment against the 
appellant for damages to which the respondent was not entitled 
because of respondent's failure to comply with requirements of 
Section 70A-9-504 Utah Code Annotated 1953, refused to allow the 
revocation of acceptance or rescission of the contract between 
the parties as was justified by the acts of respondent and 
awarded excessive damages to which respondent was not entitled. 
This court should correct those errors and either rule as a 
matter of law the respondent is not entitled to judgment against 
the defendant, reverse the trial court and direct a dismissal of 
the plaintiff's complaint, or reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and remand this matter for a proper trial between the 
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parties where all issues can be fairly considered by the trial 
court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of April, 1980. 
~LV~, 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
79 South State Street 
P. o. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed two copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant in Case No. 16847, postage 
prepaid, this 30th day of April, 1980, to Carmen E. Kipp and 
Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., Attorneys for Respondent, at 32 Exchange 
Place, Suite 600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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